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Abstract: This paper presents a secure decentralized clustering algorithm for wireless
ad-hoc sensor networks. The algorithm operates without a centralized controller, operates
asynchronously, and does not require that the location of the sensors be known a priori. Based
on the cluster-based topology, secure hierarchical communication protocols and dynamic
quarantine strategies are introduced to defend against spam attacks, since this type of attacks
can exhaust the energy of sensor nodes and will shorten the lifetime of a sensor network
drastically. By adjusting the threshold of infected percentage of the cluster coverage, our
scheme can dynamically coordinate the proportion of the quarantine region and adaptively
achieve the cluster control and the neighborhood control of attacks. Simulation results show
that the proposed approach is feasible and cost effective for wireless sensor networks.
Keywords: secure communication protocols; adaptive topology control; sensor networks;
quarantine region
1. Introduction
Sensor networks are typically characterized by limited power supplies, low bandwidth, small memory
sizes and limited energy [1, 2]. Thus the resource-starved nature of sensor networks poses great
challenges for security, since wireless networks are vulnerable to security attacks due to the broadcast
nature of the transmission medium [2–15].Sensors 2010, 10 1252
In most sensor network applications, the lifetime of sensor nodes is an important concern, which
can shorten rapidly under spam attacks. Moreover, maintaining network connectivity is crucial to
provide reliable communication in wireless ad-hoc networks. In order not to rely on a central controller,
clustering is carried out by adaptive distributed control techniques. To this end, the Secure Adaptive
Distributed Topology Control Algorithm (SADTCA) aims at topology control and performs secure
self-organization in four phases: (I) Anti-node Detection, (II) Cluster Formation, (III) Key Distribution;
and (IV) Key Renewal, to protect against spam attacks.
In Phase I, in order to strengthen the network against spam attacks, the secure control is embedded
into the SADTCA. A challenge is made for all sensors in the ﬁeld such that normal nodes and anti-nodes
can be differentiated. In Phase II, based on the operation in Phase I, the normal sensors may apply the
adaptive distributed topology control algorithm (ADTCA) from [16] to partition the sensors into clusters.
In Phase III, a simple and efﬁcient key distribution scheme is used in the network. Two symmetric shared
keys, a cluster key and a gateway key, are encrypted by the pre-distributed key and are distributed locally.
A cluster key is a key shared by a clusterhead and all its cluster members, which is mainly used for
securing locally broadcast messages. Moreover, in order to form a secure inter-cluster communication
channel, a symmetric shared key may be used to encrypt the sending messages between the gateways of
adjacent clusters. Since using the same encryption key for extended periods may incur a cryptanalysis
risk, in Phase IV, key renewing may be necessary for protecting the sensor network and guarding against
the adversary getting the keys.
Built upon the cluster-based network topology, three quarantine methods, Method 1: quarantine for
clusters, Method 2: quarantine for nodes, and Method 3: quarantine for infected areas, are proposed
for dynamically determining the quarantine region. In order to explore the fundamental performance
of the SADTCA scheme, an analytical discussion and experiments are presented to investigate the
energy consumption, communication complexity, the increase of communication overheads for data
dissemination, and the percentage of the quarantine region in the sensing ﬁeld when facing the
spam attack.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In Section 2., we brieﬂy introduce the related work and
summary of security issues for wireless sensor network environment. Section 3. describes the system
modelandalgorithmforsecureself-organizationinacluster-basednetworktopology. Section4. presents
dynamic approaches for determining the quarantine region. In Section 5., we analyze the SADTCA and
make comparisons with protocols in the ﬂat-based topology. In Section 6., the simulation results are
shown and discussed. Finally, Section 7. draws conclusions and shows future research directions.
2. Literature Review
There are many vulnerabilities and threats to wireless sensor networks. The broadcast nature of the
transmission medium incurs various types of security attacks. Different schemes to detect and defend
against the attacks are proposed in [2–15]. A number of anti-nodes deployed inside the sensing ﬁeld
can originate several attacks to interfere with message transmission and even paralyze the whole sensor
network. Most network layer attacks against sensor networks fall into one of the following categories:Sensors 2010, 10 1253
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² Selective forwarding.
² Sybil attacks.
² Wormholes attacks.
² Sinkhole attacks.
² Hello ﬂood attacks.
The spam attack, which is a kind of ﬂooding Denial of Service (DoS) attack, can be carried out by the
anti-node inside the sensor network. Such attack can retard the message transmission and exhaust the
energy of a sensor node by generating spam messages frequently. In [17] and [18], the authors propose
detect and defend spam (DADS) scheme and quarantine region scheme (QRS) to address the following
issues: spamdetection, quarantinednodesdetermination, messagesauthentication, andquarantineregion
cancelation. Two detection mechanisms against spam attacks on sensor networks are proposed in
DADS [17]. The ﬁrst method is to ﬁlter incoming messages according to their contents and detect the
nodes that send faulty messages frequently. The second method uses the frequencies of messages sent by
the sensors in the same region. In DADS, the anti-node is detected by the sink, not by the sensor node.
The packets of each sensor are counted by the sink. Such centralized detection architecture can be well
suitable to a small-scale sensor network, but the total number of packets could be large in a large-scale
sensor network. Based on the distributed strategy, the QRS makes each node to detect neighbor anti-node
individually [18]. By requesting authenticated messages, each sensor node decides whether there is an
anti-node in its transmitting range or not. Comparing to the central detection architecture, the total packet
number is reduced rapidly and the limitation of scalability is eliminated.
These schemes classify the transmission range of the anti-node as the “quarantine region”. The
nodes in the quarantine region are called “quarantined nodes”. A message must be authenticated in
the quarantine regions. Any unauthenticated messages from nodes in the quarantined region will not
be replied and are discarded. The nodes outside the quarantine regions do not need authentication
to transmit a message even if the message was an originally authenticated message coming from a
quarantine region. By this partial authentication strategy, the cost of authentication is reduced effectively.
Notice that the overheads of authentication in [17, 18] are dependent on the number of anti-nodes
and the area of quarantine region. Moreover, when determining the quarantine region, the location
information of the nodes is required for the approaches in [17, 18]. In contrast, based on a cluster-based
topology, the proposed SADTCA adaptively forms the quarantine region without using network location
information. Therefore, a management scheme, such as hierarchical clustering, may be added to
further enhance the formation, message transmission, and management of a quarantine region. Our
previous works [16, 19] propose the extensive research for distributed cluster-based topology control.
In these algorithms, a cluster is suitable for a base unit of quarantine region such that the complexity of
management of quarantine region can be reduced.
Accordingly, in this paper, the cluster-based architecture efﬁciently assists in forming and managing
quarantine regions and effectively protects the network from attacks. Compared with [17, 18], ourSensors 2010, 10 1254
protocol can be used to enhance the control of quarantine region, as well as to restrain the packet number
of transmitting messages caused by the anti-node. The performance comparison of the SADTCA and
DADS is further investigated in Sections 5. and 6.
3. Secure Adaptive Distributed Topology Control Algorithm
In this section we present a secure adaptive distributed topology control algorithm (SADTCA) for
wireless sensor networks. The proposed algorithm organizes the sensors in four phases: Anti-node
Detection, Cluster Formation, Key Distribution, and Key Renewal. The main keys used in the network
are (a) Pre-distributed Key, (b) Cluster Key, and (c) Gateway Key. Each sensor is pre-distributed with
three initial symmetric keys, an identiﬁcation message, and a key pool. Pre-distributed key is established
with key management schemes [6, 7], and is used for anti-node detection and cluster formation in Phases
I and II. The Cluster Key and Gateway Key are used for key distribution in Phase III. The key pool is
used for key renewing in Phase IV. Note that since our research aims at network topology control, the
pre-distributed key establishment is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.1. Phase I: Anti-node Detection
In order to strengthen the network against spam attacks, the secure control is embedded into the
SADTCA. An authenticated broadcasting mechanism, such as the ¹TESLA in SPINS [20], may be
applied in this phase. In the authenticated broadcasting mechanism, a challenge is made for all sensors
in the ﬁeld such that normal nodes and anti-nodes can be differentiated. The challenge is that when a
sensor broadcasts a Hello message to identify its neighbors, it encrypts the plaintext and then broadcasts;
when receiving the Hello message, the sensor decrypts it. If the sensor decrypts the received message
successfully, thesenderisconsiderednormal. Otherwise, thesenderissaidtobeananti-node. Therefore,
we keep on the network topology without anti-nodes in order to make the network safe.
If an anti-node is presented in the ﬁrst deployment of a sensor network, its neighboring normal nodes
will notice the existence of the anti-node, since the anti-node will fail in authentication. Thus, referring
to the cluster-based topology formed in Phase II, the spam attacks can be handled by adaptively forming
the quarantine region as detailed in Section 4..
Notice that an external attack can be prevented by the operation of Phase I. In this work, we do not
have a lightweight countermeasure to defend against authenticated malicious nodes. If the authenticated
node is compromised and perform malicious activities, a mechanism for evicting the compromised nodes
is required [7].
3.2. Phase II: Cluster Formation
When sensors are ﬁrst deployed, the adaptive distributed topology control algorithm (ADTCA)
from [16] may be used to partition the sensors into clusters. The following subsections overview the
mechanisms of the ADTCA scheme for cluster formation.Sensors 2010, 10 1255
Clusterhead Selection
Each sensor sets a random waiting timer, broadcasts its presence via a ‘Hello’ signal, and listens
for its neighbor’s ‘Hello.’ The sensors that hear many neighbors are good candidates for initiating new
clusters; those with few neighbors should choose to wait. By adjusting randomized waiting timers, the
sensors can coordinate themselves into sensible clusters, which can then be used as a basis for further
communication and data processing.
Sensors update their neighbor information (i.e., a counter specifying how many neighbors it has
detected) and decrease the random waiting time based on each ‘new’ Hello message received. This
encourages those sensors with many neighbors to become clusterheads. The updating formula for the
random waiting time of sensor i is:
WT
(k+1)
i = ° ¢ WT
(k)
i (1)
where WT
(k)
i is the waiting time of sensor i at time step k and 0 < ° < 1 is inversely proportional to the
number of neighbors. Therefore, if the timer expires, then the sensor declares itself to be a clusterhead,
a focal point of a new cluster. However, events may intervene that cause a sensor to shorten or cancel its
timer. For example, whenever the sensor detects a new neighbor, it shortens the timer. On the other hand,
if a neighbor declares itself to be a clusterhead, the sensor cancels its own timer and joins the neighbor’s
new cluster.
After applying the ADTCA, there are three different kinds of sensors: (1) the clusterheads (2) sensors
with an assigned cluster ID (3) sensors without an assigned cluster ID, which will join any nearby cluster
after¿ secondsandbecome2-hopsensors, where¿ isaconstantchosentobelargerthanallofthewaiting
times. In this phase, each sensor initiates 2 rounds of local ﬂooding to its 1-hop neighboring sensors,
one for broadcasting sensor ID and the other for broadcasting cluster ID, to select clusterheads and form
2-hop clusters. Hence, the time complexity is O(2) rounds. Thus, the topology of the ad-hoc network is
now represented by a hierarchical collection of clusters. The procedures of initial cluster formation are
summarized in Table 1.
Gateway Selection
Observe that the clustering scheme induces non-overlapping clusters. Accordingly, to interconnect
two adjacent non-overlapping clusters, one cluster member from each cluster must become a gateway.
This subsection presents a method of choosing distributed gateways for adjacent non-overlapping
clusters. Random waiting times and local information are applied to select gateways and further achieve
communication between clusters. The result of the Phase II processing is that each cluster i assigns a
single member to communicate with each nearby cluster j. The waiting timers help to ensure that the
chosen member is one of the nearest members even though the topology of the system is unknown. If the
clusters are too far apart (outside the range of communication R), no gateway sensors will be assigned.
According to the process of cluster formation, sensors can obtain local information and know the
number of neighboring sensors in adjacent clusters. Therefore, given the local information, sensors
may initialize their counters for gateway selection. The initialization process is summarized in
Table 2. Based on the counter, clusterheads broadcast messages to trigger the gateway selection process.
After applying the procedure for determining gateways, the gateway nodes broadcast messages to updateSensors 2010, 10 1256
the connectivity information and activate the linked cluster architecture. The procedure for choosing
gateways is summarized in Table 3.
Table 1. Secure Cluster Formation.
1. Each sensor initializes a random waiting timer with a value WT
(0)
i .
2. Each sensor encrypts the Plaintext with the Hello message.
3. Each sensor transmits the Hello message at random times:
Draw a sample r from the distribution ¸ ¢ WT
(0)
i ¢ U(0;1), where 0 < ¸ < 0:5
wait r time units and then transmit the Hello.
4. Each sensor receives the Hello message and decrypts it.
if the decrypted Ciphertext is the same as the preload message
the sensor is a normal node.
else
(a) the sensor is an anti-node.
(b) it should be removed from the neighbor list.
end
5. Establish and update the neighbor identiﬁcation:
if a sensor receives a message of assigning a cluster ID at time step k
(a) join the corresponding cluster.
(b) draw a sample r
0 from the distribution WT
(k)
i ¢ U(0;1).
(c) wait r
0 time units and then send an updated Hello message with
the new cluster ID.
(d) stop the waiting timer. (Stop!)
else
collect neighboring information.
end
6. Decrease the random waiting time according to equation (1).
7. Clusterhead check:
if WTi = 0 and the neighboring sensors are not in another cluster
(a) broadcast itself to be a clusterhead.
(b) assign the neighboring sensors to cluster ID i. (Stop!)
elseif WTi = 0 and some of the neighboring sensors are in other clusters
stand by. (Stop!)
else
go to Step 3.
endSensors 2010, 10 1257
Table 2. Description of the Counter Initialization Process.
while (sensor ni is a neighboring sensor of mj)
if ni is a clusterhead
C
(ni)
ij = C
(ni)
ij + 10¯.
else
C
(ni)
ij = C
(ni)
ij + ¯.
end
end
where C
(ni)
ij is the counter of sensor ni for cluster j,
¯ = ®(1 ¡
dnimj
R ) with a positive integer ®,
dnimj is the distance between sensors ni and mj, and
R is the transmission range.
Table 3. Description of Gateway Selection.
a) Based on the cluster formation in Phase I, clusterheads broadcast
messages to trigger the gateway selection process.
b) Initialize a vector of random waiting times WT
(ni;k)
ij , where
WT
(ni;k)
ij is the waiting time of sensor ni for cluster j at time
step k.
c) Initialize a counter of sensor ni, C
(ni)
ij , for gateway selection
in cluster i to cluster j.
d) Decrease the waiting time
WT
(ni;k+1)
ij = WT
(ni;k)
ij ¡ C
(ni)
ij .
e) Gateway check:
if WT
(ni;k)
ij = 0
(1) assign Gij = ni, and then
Gij broadcasts the gateway information to its neighbors.
(2) set C
(xi)
ij = 0 and stop the waiting timer for all neighboring
sensors xi in cluster i.
else
go to step d).
end
The goal of Phase I is to guard against anti-nodes hiding in the network and to identify the normal
nodes. This is very important because if the anti-nodes participate in the cluster construction process, we
can expect that the network operation would be heavily crippled. Figure 1 shows the network topologies
of a sensor network with and without secure topology control. With ﬁve anti-nodes (cyan) randomlySensors 2010, 10 1258
deployed in the ﬁeld, Figure 1 (left) depicts that anti-nodes play the roles of two clusterheads and three
member nodes without secure topology control. On the other hand, with secure topology control, Figure
1 (right) shows that anti-nodes have been intentionally eliminated and then the network members are
normal nodes. Hence, the anti-nodes may not affect the network during the cluster forming process.
Figure 1. The inﬂuence of anti-nodes (cyan) ; the sensor network without secure topology
control (left), the sensor network with secure topology control (right).
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3.3. Phase III: Key Distribution
According to the cluster construction in Phase II, a simple and efﬁcient key distribution scheme is
applied in the network. In this phase, two symmetric shared keys, a cluster key and a gateway key,
are encrypted by the pre-distributed key and are distributed locally. A cluster key is a key shared by a
clusterhead and all its cluster members, which is mainly used for securing locally broadcast messages,
e.g., routing control information, or securing sensor messages. Moreover, in order to form a secure
communication channel between the gateways of adjacent clusters, a symmetric shared key may be used
to encrypt the sending message. The process of key distribution is shown in Figure 2. In this phase,
another challenge may be made to guard against anti-nodes that have not been found out in Phase I.
The challenge is that if any sensor cannot decrypt ciphertext encrypted by a cluster key or a gateway
key, the node will be removed from the member or neighbor list. Therefore, the security of intra-cluster
communication and inter-cluster communication are established upon a cluster key and a shared gateway
key, respectively.Sensors 2010, 10 1259
Figure 2. Phase III: Key distribution for WSNs.
3.4. Phase IV: Key Renewal
Using the same encryption key for extended periods may incur a cryptanalysis risk. To protect the
sensor network and prevent the the adversary from getting the keys, key renewing may be necessary. In
the case of the revocation, in order to accomplish the renewal of the keys, the originator node generates
a renewal index, and forwards the index to the gateways. The procedures of key renewal are detailed
as follows.
Initially all clusterheads (CHs) choose an originator to start the “key renewals”, and then it will send
the index to all clusterheads in the network. There are many possible approaches for determining the
originator. For instance, the clusterhead with the highest energy level or the clusterhead with the lowest
cluster ID. After selecting the originator, it initializes the “Key renewal” process and sends the index to
its neighboring clusters by gateways. Then the clusterhead refreshes the two keys from the key pool and
broadcasts the two new keys to their cluster members locally. The operation repeats the way through to
all clusters in the network. The key renewing process is depicted in Figure 3. A period of time (Tr) is
set in order to avoid that the originator does not start the “key renewal” process. If the other clusters do
not receive the index after Tr, they will choose a new originator from themselves. The method helps to
rescue when the previous originator is broken off. The focal procedures of the SADTCA are summarized
in Figure 4.Sensors 2010, 10 1260
Figure 3. Key renewal process: the originator sends the renewal index to other clusterheads
through gateways (left); the clusterheads send the renewal index to their cluster members
(right).
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4. Determining the Quarantine Region
If the anti-nodes are scattered randomly in the ﬁrst deployment of a sensor network, the anti-nodes
can be detected by authentication in Phase I of the SADTCA. On the other hand, given the cluster-based
topology formed in Phase II of the SADTCA, the clusterhead and cluster members may detect external
attacks and check the unsolicited messages by observing the abnormal behaviors of the sending nodes.
For instance, ﬁltering the content of the incoming messages, detecting the frequency of the faulty
messages, or checking the sending frequency of messages. Thus, these scenarios may imply a possible
spam attack and then the clusterhead may broadcast a message throughout the whole cluster to announce
theexistenceofanti-nodes. Therefore, inordertodefendagainstspamattacks, threedistributedmethods,
Method 1: quarantine for clusters, Method 2: quarantine for nodes, and Method 3: quarantine for
infected areas, are proposed for dynamically determining the quarantine region.
4.1. Method 1: Quarantine for Clusters
When the clusterhead ﬁnds out the occurrence of a spam attack, it broadcasts a message throughout
the whole cluster. In this condition, the set of quarantine nodes is composed of the clusterhead and
cluster members. Note that the performance of the SADTCA with Method 1 may be considered as a
conservative approach for forming the quarantine region.
4.2. Method 2: Quarantine for Nodes
In this scheme, the quarantine region is the region where the transmission of the anti-node can be
received. Thus, the transmission range of an anti-node may be denoted as the distance between the
anti-node and the borderline of the quarantine region. The concept of this method is the same as the
DASA scheme. However, if the quarantined node is a clusterhead, the whole cluster will be quarantinedSensors 2010, 10 1261
since clusterheads are important nodes for controlling the cluster operation. On the other hand, if the
quarantined node is a cluster member, the whole cluster will not be quarantined.
Figure 4. Secure distributed topology control for WSNs.Sensors 2010, 10 1262
4.3. Method 3: The Infected Areas
Here we introduce a way to determine the set of quarantine nodes and quarantine region with a
threshold of the infected percentage of cluster coverage. Assuming the uniform distribution of the sensor
nodes, the clusters may be located one by one from the coordinate of (0,0) in X-Y plane as shown in
Figure 5 (left). Thus, a decision for quarantine region may be made with proper settings for the normal
clusters and anti-nodes.
Figure 5. The geometric illustration of cluster distribution; an ideal distribution of clusters
(left), the infected region O of a cluster (right).
Since each cluster is responsible for sensing the scope in the network `2=NCH, the possible coverage
range of a cluster is
r =
s
`2
¼NCH
(2)
where ` is the side length of the sensing square and NCH is the number of clusters. Accordingly, the
coordinates of the clusters yields
(xi;yj) = ((2i ¡ 1)r;(2j ¡ 1)r) =
Ã
(2i ¡ 1)
s
`2
¼NCH
(2j ¡ 1)
s
`2
¼NCH
!
(3)
where 1 · i ·
p
NCH and 1 · j ·
p
NCH. Assume the coordinates and the transmission range of an
anti-node are (xe;ye) and re, respectively. As depicted in Figure 5 (right), the infected region O between
the coverage of a neighboring clusterhead and an anti-node is given by
O = ¼
Ã
r
2
"
sin¡1(AB
r )
360
#
+ r
2
e
"
sin¡1(AB
re )
360
#!
¡
AB
2
µ
rcos
·
sin
¡1(
AB
2r
)
¸
+ re cos
·
sin
¡1(
AB
2re
)
¸¶
(4)Sensors 2010, 10 1263
where AB is the length between two intersection points A and B. Therefore, given the infected region O
and a threshold of infected percentage of the cluster coverage ´, the decision of quarantine region may
be determined. For instance, when
O ¸ ´ ¢ (¼r
2) (5)
the infected cluster is quarantined.
Accordingly, when O=¼r2 ¸ ´, Method 1 may be applied; otherwise, Method 2 may be chosen to
quarantine the whole cluster. Therefore, Method 3 achieves the operation balance of Methods 1 and 2
for establishing local quarantine regions.
5. Performance Analysis
This section analyzes the performance of the proposed SADTCA scheme. We focus on the increase
of communication overheads for data dissemination when facing the spam attack. In order to simplify
the analysis, assume that the sensors are uniformly distributed. Established upon the dimension of the
infected area, the quarantine region may be determined for the infected cluster as detailed in Section 4..
Furthermore, the average hop difference between the information routing by the shortest path without
considering the quarantine region and the routing by the shortest path avoiding the quarantine region is
derived in Section 5.1.
5.1. The Routing Variation
Given one anti-node in the network, the shortest routing path may be interfered by the quarantined
clusters. Such interference leads to the extra routing hops, which is demonstrated in Figure 6. The impact
of the quarantine region on routing performance is investigated by calculating the routing variation for
sending one message from one cluster to another cluster (normalized). Let the routing variation E[N
(k)
hop]
be the hop difference between the shortest path for routing with quarantine region and without quarantine
region of source cluster k. Suppose that anti-nodes are mutually independent and the transmission range
of anti-nodes is the same as normal nodes. Since E[N
(k)
hop] is related to the source, the number and
location of quarantine cluster, and the destination, referring to Figure 7, the locations of source clusters
are classiﬁed into three possible groups. Hence, the normalized routing variation E[N
(k)
hop] may yield
E[N
(k)
hop] =
3 X
i=1
m X
j=0
P
(k;i)
j ¢ E[N
(k;i)
j ] (6)
where P
(k;i)
j is the probability of j quarantine clusters with source cluster k belonging to group i,
E[N
(k;i)
j ] is the routing variation with j quarantined clusters with source cluster k belonging to group i,
and m is the maximal value of the quarantined clusters. Thus, the normalized routing variation E[N1
hop]
with one anti-node is given by
E[N
1
hop] =
1
NCH
¢
X
k2I
3 X
i=1
m X
j=0
P
(k;i)
j ¢ E[N
(k;i)
j ] (7)
where I is the index set of clusterheads.Sensors 2010, 10 1264
Figure 6. The path interference of the quarantined cluster; one quarantined cluster (left),
two quarantined clusters (right).
Figure 7. Three possible locations of the source; group 1 (left), group 2 (middle), group 3
(right).
Referring to Figure 8 for group 1, Figure 9 for group 2, Figure 10 for group 3, and with the infected
percentage of the cluster coverage ´ = 1/3, the normalized routing variation E[N1
hop] is
E[N
1
hop] ' 0:0965 (8)
from experimental analysis. Similarly, assuming ´ is 1/5, we obtain
E[N
1
hop] ' 0:1815 (9)
Given that the sensors are uniformly distributed with high network density, the anti-nodes may be
considered as mutually independent. Thus, the normalized routing variation E[Nhop] with Q anti-nodes
yields
E[N
Q
hop] = Q ¢ E[N
1
hop] (10)Sensors 2010, 10 1265
which depicts the difference between the number of hops of the shortest path for routing with quarantine
region and that for routing without quarantine region.
Figure 8. The locations of quarantined clusters given the location of source group 1; one
cluster quarantined (left), two clusters quarantined with possible locations of the second
quarantined cluster (right).
Figure 9. The locations of quarantined clusters given the location of source group 2; one
cluster quarantined (left), two clusters quarantined with possible locations of the second
quarantined cluster (right).Sensors 2010, 10 1266
Figure 10. The locations of quarantined clusters given the location of source group 3; one
cluster quarantined (left), two clusters quarantined with possible locations of the second
quarantined cluster (right).
5.2. Analysis of Energy Consumption
This subsection analyzes the energyconsumption of the SADTCA when executing the following three
phases: cluster formation (Phase II), key distribution (Phase III), and key renewal (Phase IV). The total
power requirements include both the power required to transmit and to receive (or process) messages.
Phase II: Clusterhead Selection
The energy consumption of clusterhead selection assuming homogenous sensors is examined. In the
initialization phase, each sensor broadcasts a Hello message to its neighboring sensors. Therefore, the
number of transmissions NTx is equal to the number of sensors in the network, n, and the number of
receptions NRx is the sum of the neighboring sensors of each sensor. That is,
NTx = n; and NRx =
n X
j=1
Nj (11)
where Nj is the number of neighboring sensors of sensor j.
As a sensor, say sensor i, meets the conditions of being a clusterhead, it broadcasts this and assigns
cluster ID i to its neighboring sensors. Its neighboring sensors then transmit a signal to their neighbors to
update cluster ID information. During this clustering phase, (1+Ni) transmissions and (Ni+
P
j2Ci Nj)
receptions are executed, where Ci is the index set of neighboring sensors of sensor i. This procedure
is applied to all clusterheads and their cluster members. Now let Nc
Tx and Nc
Rx denote the number of
transmissions and receptions for all clusters, respectively. Hence,
N
c
Tx =
X
i2I
(1 + Ni) (12)Sensors 2010, 10 1267
N
c
Rx =
X
i2I
(
X
j2Ci
Nj + Ni) (13)
where I is a index set of clusterheads. Therefore, the total number of transmissions NT and the number
of receptions NR are
NT = NTx + N
c
Tx = n +
X
i2I
(1 + Ni) (14)
NR = NRx + N
c
Rx =
n X
j=1
Nj +
X
i2I
(
X
j2Ci
Nj + Ni) (15)
Suppose that the energy needed for the transmission is ET, which depends on the transmitting range
R, the energy needed for the reception is ER, the energy needed for the encryption is Eenp, and the
energy needed for decryption is Edep. From (24) and (25), the total energy consumption, Etotal, for
cluster formation in the wireless sensor network is
Etotal = NT ¢ (ET + Eenp) + NR ¢ (ER + Edep) (16)
Observe that the above analysis is suitable for any transmitting range. However, overly small
transmission ranges may result in isolated clusters whereas overly large transmission ranges may result
in a single cluster. Therefore, in order to optimize energy consumption and encourage linking between
clusters, it is more reasonable to consider the minimum transmission power (or range R) which will
result in a fully connected network.
Phase III: Key Distribution
In order to simplify the presentation, the main notations are introduced as follows: let I denote the
index set of clusterheads; let H denote the index set of 1-hop cluster members in the network; let Hi
denote the index set of 1-hop cluster members of cluster i (a subset of H); let M denote the index set of
2-hop cluster members in the network; let Mi denote the index set of 2-hop cluster members of cluster i
(a subset of M); similarly, let S be the index set of sensors neighboring with 2-hop cluster members; let
Si be the index set of sensors neighboring with 2-hop cluster members of cluster i (a subset of S); let G
be the index set of gateway nodes.
In this phase, Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange is used when setting the gateway key and Epro is the
consumed energy of Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange. When clusterheads broadcast messages to trigger the
key distribution procedure, the number of transmission DT and reception DR can be expressed by
DT =
X
i2I
X
j2Si
Nj + jIj + jGj (17)
DR =
X
i2I
X
j2Hi
Nj +
X
i2I
X
j2Mi
Nj + jGj (18)
Thus, based on the energy needed to transmit and receive, the total energy consumption for key
distribution yields:
Ekey = DTET + DRER + jGjEpro (19)Sensors 2010, 10 1268
Phase IV: Key Renewal
In a unicast-based group rekeying, the communication complexity is O(N), where N is the group
size. Logical key trees can be used to reduce the complexity of group rekeying schemes (from O(N) to
O(logN) [6]) and to enhance the scalability of group rekeying operation. Hence, based on a logical key
tree, the communication cost of a group rekeying in the SADTCA is O(logN).
5.3. Comparison of the SADTCA and the DADS
This subsection considers the energy consumption for forming a quarantine region with the proposed
SADTCA scheme and the DADS [17] when facing the spam attack.
The DADS
For the DADS scheme, denote dq as the distance between the anti-node and the borderline of the
quarantine region. Here we consider two scenarios, dq = R and dq = 2R, where R is the transmission
range of a sensor node. The ﬁrst scenario considers that an anti-node threatens the neighboring sensor
nodes that are of dq = R. The second scenario considers that an anti-node threatens the whole cluster.
Since the network infrastructure of the SADTCA is based on 2-hop cluster topology, the DASA scheme
with dq = 2R may be used to benchmark the performance of the proposed SADTCA with Method 1
(quarantine for clusters).
For the DADS scheme with dq = R, the total energy consumption for determining the set of
quarantine nodes is
E
(R)
total = N
(R)
T ¢ (ET + Eenp) + N
(R)
R ¢ (ER + Edep) (20)
where the total number of transmissions N
(R)
T and the number of receptions N
(R)
R are
N
(R)
T = Na and N
(R)
R = Na +
X
i2B
(R)
a
Ni (21)
Note that Na is the number of neighboring sensors of the anti-node and B
(R)
a is the index set of sensors
neighboring with the anti-node.
Similarly, for the DADS scheme with dq = 2R, considering the authentication phase and the
quarantine region, the total number of transmissions N
(2R)
T and the number of receptions N
(2R)
R may
be approximated by
N
(2R)
T = 2Na (22)
N
(2R)
R = Na + 2
X
i2B
(2R)
a
Ni (23)
where B
(2R)
a is the index set of sensors neighboring with the anti-node. Thus, the total energy
consumption yields E
(2R)
total = N
(2R)
T ¢ (ET + Eenp) + N
(2R)
R ¢ (ER + Edep)
The SADTCA
For the SADTCA scheme, three distributed methods, Method 1: quarantine for clusters, Method
2: quarantine for nodes, and Method 3: quarantine for infected areas, are examined for dynamicallySensors 2010, 10 1269
determining the quarantine region.
In Method 1, the set of quarantine nodes is composed of the clusterhead and cluster members. Assume
cluster k is attacked by an anti-node. Thus, the total number of transmissions NT and the number of
receptions NR are
NT = 1 + Na + jMkj (24)
NR = Nch + 2
X
i2Mk
Ni +
X
i2Ba
Ni (25)
where Mk is the index set of 2-hop cluster members of cluster k, Ba is the index set of sensors
neighboring with the anti-node, Na is the number of neighboring sensors of the anti-node, and Nch
is the number of neighboring sensors of the clusterhead. The energy consumption in a cluster is
E
(ch)
total = NT ¢ (ET + Eenp) + NR ¢ (ER + Edep). Since the quarantine nodes may belong to different
clusters, the total energy consumption yields
Etotal = Nc ¢ E
(ch)
total (26)
where Nc is the number of neighboring clusters of the anti-node.
In Method 2, assuming that a clusterhead is not quarantined, the SADTCA scheme consumes the
same energy as the DADS scheme with dq = R without using the information of cluster topology (as
described in (20)).
In Method 3, the proposed SADTCA introduces a way to determine the set of quarantine nodes and
quarantine region with a threshold of the infected percentage of cluster coverage ´ (as detailed in Section
4.3.). Thus, when O=¼r2 < ´, the energy consumption can be described by (20); otherwise, we may use
(26) to represent the energy consumption for quarantining the whole cluster.
Based upon the above analysis, the energy consumptions of the proposed quarantine strategies are
comparable to that of the DADS scheme. The comparison of the percentage of quarantine region in the
sensing ﬁeld with the proposed quarantine methods and the DADS scheme is described in Section 6.4..
6. Simulation
In this section, we study the performance of the proposed SADTCA scheme via simulation when
executing the four cases: quarantine for clusters, quarantine for nodes, quarantine with ´ ¸ 1=3, and
quarantine with ´ ¸ 1=5 (as detailed in Section 4.). Referring to [18], the simulation ﬂow chart is shown
in Figure 11.
For the experiments, 100, 500, 1000 (Figures 12) sensor nodes are randomly deployed in the sensor
ﬁeld 100£100 units in size. In order to maintain the network connectivity with high probability, the
transmitting range R of sensors may be given by [21]:
R ¼ `
d
r
log`
n
(27)
where n is the number of sensors and ` is the length of sides of a d-dimensional cube.
Here we focus on two kinds of variation. One is the hop difference between the shortest path through
the quarantine region and the shortest path avoiding the quarantine region. The other is the number of
hops with authenticated messages through the quarantine region. We assume that each cluster sends one
message to other clusters, except the quarantined clusters, and then calculate the total number of hops.Sensors 2010, 10 1270
Figure 11. The simulation ﬂowchart of the SADTCA scheme.
Figure 12. A random network with 500 sensors, R = 6.33, and ` = 100 (left); a random
network with 1000 sensors, R = 4.48, and ` = 100 (right).
6.1. Case I: Quarantine for Clusters
This set of experiments investigates the performance of the quarantine strategy for clusters with
varying the number of anti-nodes ranging from 1 to 5. We assume that the attacker threatens different
clusters. If the cluster is attacked, it will be quarantined. A description of quarantine process for clusters
is illustrated in Figure 13. As depicted in Figure 14, the number of extra hops for bypassing routing pathSensors 2010, 10 1271
is less than the number of authenticated hops for going through the quarantined clusters. Thus, a
bypassing routing may be efﬁcient in this case.
Figure 13. Authentication of quarantine process for clusters (Case I).
Figure 14. Case I: the number of extra hops for bypassing routing path and the number of
authenticated hops for going through the quarantined clusters.
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6.2. Case II: Quarantine for Nodes
In Case II, we assume that the attacker threatens the nodes. If the node is attacked, it will be
quarantined. When the quarantined node is a member, the authentications are executed between the
quarantined node and the clusterhead, and between the quarantined node and the attacker since it may
prevent the threat from extending to the whole cluster. In this scenario, a message is allowed to passSensors 2010, 10 1272
through the cluster. A description of quarantine for nodes is shown in Figure 15 and the result is
depicted in Figure 16, which compares the total number of hops with authenticated messages through the
quarantine region for Case I and Case II, respectively. Figure 16 shows that the number of authenticated
hops for going through the infected clusters is less than the number of extra hops for bypassing the
routing path. Hence, a bypass routing may not be efﬁcient in this case. Observe that the number of hops
in Case II is much less than that in Case I. Therefore, Case II may have a better energy control than
Case I.
Figure 15. Authentication of quarantined nodes (Case II): a member node (left) and a
clusterhead (right).
Figure 16. Case II: the number of extra hops for bypassing routing path and the number
of authenticated hops for going through the quarantined clusters (left); the comparison of
authenticated hops of Case I and Case II (right).
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6.3. Quarantine for Infected Areas (Cases III and IV)
When anti-nodes start spam attacks, the quarantine region of the infected cluster can be determined
based on the dimension of infected area (O) as detailed in Section 4. In Case III, if the dimension ratio
of infected area (O) to the cluster coverage is over 1/3, the cluster will be quarantined. Similarly, in
Case IV, if the dimension ratio of infected area (O) to the cluster coverage is over 1/5, the cluster will
be quarantined. Assuming the sensors are uniformly distributed, instead of using the criterion in (5),
the ratio of the number of nodes within the transmission range of an anti-node to the number of nodes
within a cluster sensing scope (i.e., the number of infected cluster members) may be applied to determine
the quarantine region. Experimental results show that this ratio can well represent the cover ratio in a
random network with high network density.
We assume an anti-node’s transmission range is the same as normal nodes. The results of Case III
and Case IV are depicted in Figure 17 (left) and Figure 17 (right), respectively. Figure 17 shows that
compared with the scheme in Case III, the mechanism in Case IV is more secure to defend against spam
attacks, but with higher energy consumption. Figure 18 depicts that with a larger network scale, the
performance of the proposed approach matches well with the derived ideal results. Note that the (Inf) in
this ﬁgure indicates that a bypassing routing path is not reachable due to the low density of nodes.
Figure 17. The number of extra hops for bypassing routing path and the number of
authenticated hops for going through the quarantined clusters: the result of O ¸ 1/3 (Case
III) (left), the result of O ¸ 1/5 (Case IV) (right).
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Figure 18. Average extra hops for bypassing routing path and the ideal line of O ¸ 1/3
(Case III) (left), the result and the ideal line of O ¸ 1/5 (Case IV) (right).
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6.4. Proportion of the Quarantine Region
The percentage of the quarantine region in the sensing ﬁeld impacts two performance metrics of
sensor networks: network lifetime and network connectivity. This is because the message authentication
in quarantine region represents extra energy consumption of sensors, which may shorten the lifetime of
sensor networks. Moreover, with a high percentage of quarantine region in the network, a sensing ﬁeld
might be partitioned due to the energy depletion of infected sensor nodes. Notice that the quarantine
region proportion reﬂects the control of infected nodes within the neighborhood of an attack.
Referring to the transmission range of sensors given by (27), Figure 19 (left) and Figure 19 (right)
show the cluster topology and the average percentage of the quarantine region with 250 sensor nodes
using different quarantine methods, respectively. The quarantine strategy for clusters (Case I) stands for
the most strict quarantine condition and the quarantine strategy for nodes (Case II) stands for the loosest
one. In the worst case (Case I), 5 anti-nodes cause about 35% of the entire network to be marked as
the quarantine region. Thus, only about 35% of the network nodes need to authenticate the messages,
which means the 65% of network nodes do not pay the cost for authentication. The quarantine region
proportion of Case II is about half of the proportion of quarantine region in Case I (about 17%). The
quarantine strategies for infected areas (Cases III and IV) can reduce the average percentage to 24%
(Case IV) and even 19% (Case III).
Observe that, as shown in Figure 19 (right), the performance of the DADS with dq = R may represent
a lower bound for the performance of the SADTCA with the quarantine strategies. Due to the 2-hop
cluster topology, the quarantine strategy for clusters (Case I) expands the quarantine region, which makes
the average percentage of Case I close to that of the DADS with dq = 2R. Thus, the DASA scheme with
dq = 2R may be used to benchmark the performance of the proposed SADTCA with Method 1 (i.e.,
Case I: quarantine for clusters).
The following set of experiments investigates the inﬂuence of the distribution of sensor nodes on
the proportion of quarantine region. Here two sensor deployment strategies are considered: (I) MakingSensors 2010, 10 1275
sensor density high at the center of the terrain, and (II) Making sensor density high at the border of the
terrain. For deployment strategy I, Figure 20 (right) shows the average percentage of the quarantine
region assuming that the 250 sensors are deployed based on Gaussian distribution with the center
(x0;y0) = (50;50) and the spreads of the blob ¾x = ¾y = 0:25` (Figure 20 (left)). For deployment
strategy II, assuming that 50 sensors are deployed within the center sensing ﬁeld 80 £ 80 units in size
and the other 200 nodes are deployed outside the center square (Figure 21 (left)), Figure 21 (right)
shows the proportion of the quarantine region in the sensing ﬁeld. Observe that these performances are
similar to the one with uniform distribution as shown in Figure 19 (right). Thus, except under extreme
conditions for speciﬁc topologies, the distribution of the sensor nodes may not have signiﬁcant impact
on the performance of the proposed quarantine strategies.
Figure 19. A random network of 250 sensors deployed based on uniform distribution (left);
the average percentage of quarantine region with R = 9.4 (right).
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Figure 20. A random network of 250 sensors deployed based on Gaussian distribution with
sensor deployment strategy I (left); the average percentage of the quarantine region (right).
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In a ﬂat network topology, the DADS scheme considers the neighborhood control of an attack and
provides a heuristic way to determine the quarantine region. On the other hand, in a hierarchical network
topology, the SADTCA explores the cluster structure and applies distributed quarantine strategies toSensors 2010, 10 1276
determine the set of infected nodes. Although the DADS has a less proportion of the quarantine region,
by adjusting the threshold of infected percentage of the cluster coverage ´, our schemes can dynamically
coordinate the proportion of the quarantine region and adaptively achieve the cluster control and the
neighborhood control of attacks.
Figure 21. A random network of 250 sensors deployed based on sensor deployment strategy
II (left); the average percentage of the quarantine region (right).
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6.5. Energy Consumption
Figure 22 (left) illustrates the total number of transmission and reception in the network for executing
key distribution, which increases with the increasing number of sensors. Figure 22 (right) illustrates
the average number of transmission and reception in a cluster for executing key distribution. Observe
that with a sensible topology control in Phase II, the average number of transmission and reception in a
cluster increases slightly when the number of sensors increases.
Figure 22. Communications of key distribution process; total number of transmission and
reception in the network (left), the average number of transmission and reception in a cluster
(right).
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7. Conclusions
We describe a secure protocol for topology management in wireless sensor networks. By adaptively
forming quarantine regions, the proposed secure protocol is demonstrated to reach a network security
agreement and can effectively protect the network from energy-exhaustion attacks. Therefore, in a
hierarchical network topology, the SADTCA scheme can adapt cluster control and neighborhood control
in order to achieve dynamic topology management of the spam attacks. Compared with the DADS
scheme, our protocol can be used to enhance the control of quarantine region, as well as to restrain the
number of packet transmissions caused by anti-nodes.
Although the initial secure goals of the research have been achieved in this paper, further
experimental and theoretical extensions are possible. In our future work, we plan to involve more
mechanisms to make the protocol faultless and practical, such as developing a new algorithm to identity
anti-network sensors and proposing efﬁcient security mechanisms to make protocol suitable for adaptive
topology management.
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